Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, does the Minister agree that if and when British troops finally withdraw from Iraq—whenever that may be—part of the planning for that should be a maximum emphasis on co-operation and reinforcement of local military initiatives and forces, along the lines that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, has raised? Does she agree that it is important not to make the kind of crass mistakes made after the Iraqi invasion, when decisions were taken—I do not know by whom—to disband the entire Iraqi military, with catastrophic results? Local defence forces must be built up.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right. Local defence forces must be built up. I certainly agree that it is for the countries of the region to support Iraq when the multilateral troops withdraw, whenever that maybe. However, the responsibility for internal security in Iraq must lie with the Iraqi National Government and the Iraqi security forces, which we support.

Lord Roberts of Conwy: My Lords, is there anything to stop the states mentioned in the Question from forming their own regional security organisation? Have they shown any indication that they would wish to do so?

Lord Dykes: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	What steps they are taking to continue dialogue with the other European Union governments on the matters discussed at Hampton Court on 27 October, in advance of the December European Council.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, for once I agree with the Liberal Democrat spokesman. Has not the British presidency of the European Union been a disappointment, to put it mildly? Does the Minister agree that very little has been achieved, except for the negotiations with Turkey, that there is no progress at all on the constitution, and that the Prime Minister is right to use the word "stalled" in relation to the whole system? In the last few weeks of the presidency, can we not see some real initiatives to help to shape Europe effectively for the future instead of allowing inertia to prevail.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, inertia certainly does not prevail. We have enjoyed the presidency greatly, and I am very sorry that the noble Lord opposite has not. On the constitution, as noble Lords have said on many occasions, it is right that discussions do not take place until the Austrian presidency under which we shall have pause for reflection. On concrete tangible matters, apart from the better regulation programme that I mentioned earlier, there are issues such as the European security and defence policy policing missions, which are very important for ensuring the security not only of our continent but also of the world. For example, the first EU mission to Aceh is extremely important.

Lord Tomlinson: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that, in the follow up to Hampton Court, we should not limit future discussions to that agenda? An important part of the future diplomatic agenda must be the pursuit of budgetary rigour and discipline. In relation to the recently produced report of the Court of Auditors, will Her Majesty's Government give serious thought to supporting the demand of the European Parliament's budgetary control committee that each member state should give a statement of assurance on its part of the 80 per cent of the budget that is spent in member states? Then we could aggregate and see how well member states are doing spending Community money.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for not questioning my integrity. The European Union provides peace, security and prosperity. The citizens of this country, and of the European Union as a whole, have better living standards and are more secure, thanks to the European Union. That is thanks for the past 50 years, and we look forward to the next 50 years as an integrated member of the European Union.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I would greatly miss the statements made by the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch. But I would also say that, as we move towards greater globalisation, if the European Union did not exist, we would have to invent something like it because we have to work closely together with other countries in order to secure the competitiveness and security of our country.

Lord Lawson of Blaby: My Lords, if I may return to humdrum reality, can the Minister give an assurance that, however anxious the British Government may be to secure a budgetary agreement during their presidency—which would be desirable, but is certainly not necessary—there will be no question of any sacrifice or abrogation of the United Kingdom budgetary rebate? I should like to have an assurance on that because, as many people have pointed out—not least the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, who had an important part in negotiating it on behalf of the Government—the resolution provides that the rebate diminishes automatically as agricultural support diminishes, so there is no need for any separate action.

The Earl of Selborne: My Lords, I apologise for interrupting the Minister; I thought that he was about to sit down. Does he agree that while it is clearly unacceptable to have in the environment more than 100,000 untested chemicals that pre-date 1981, which is the case at the moment, it would be equally unacceptable for much more testing than would be required to take place simply to deal with chemicals of high concern? If there is to be more testing, there are clearly implications for animal testing and competitive issues. Increased testing should apply only to those chemicals which he mentioned as being of high concern, as rated by the European Standards Authority.

Lord Barnett: My Lords, I ask my noble friend to ignore the advice recently given by the noble Lord, Lord Lawson of Blaby, and indicate—as I hope we have indicated—that we would be willing to phase out our rebate, provided that there was a complete phasing out of all the food subsidies?

Lord Bach: My Lords, I can only repeat what my noble friend Lady Royall, said from the Front Bench a few minutes ago. We agree that the abatement is an anomaly, but it arises because of another anomaly caused by the imbalances on the expenditure side of the current budget. The Prime Minister has made it clear that if there were a serious effort to correct those imbalances the abatement would be on the table. I cannot do better than to quote my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary who said, on 1 November:
	"The current abatement is an anomaly, but it is an anomaly on an anomaly, and the most profound anomaly is the structure and funding of the common agricultural policy".—[Official Report, Commons, 1/11/05; col. 708.]

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: My Lords, does the Minister agree that, in the light of the reforms to which he referred to that took place in 2003, with single farm payments coming in only this year, the fact that the sugar regime is about to be radically reformed and that we can go to the WTO in Hong Kong in early December sure that the reforms that we have already made will already make an impression, it is time for the agricultural industry to settle down and absorb those reforms before further reforms take place?

Lord Williamson of Horton: My Lords, while I strongly support the need to move forward on agricultural reform, does the Minister agree that the enormous changes in the use of the EU budget away from intervention measures towards direct payments to farmers, linked to environmental and similar objectives, is well under way, and that the Government are to be congratulated on that? The Government should not hide their light under a bushel; they should let it shine out on the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, and elsewhere. Would the Minister confirm that that is the situation, and that, because of the changes, the great majority of the budget goes on direct payments, while a very small percentage of it goes on market intervention, export subsidies and so on?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I assure the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, that there is never a reason for him to seek to ingratiate himself with the Government. His stock, as all noble Lords know, is already incredibly high.
	The noble Lord's amendment touches on the drafting of Clause 1(6), which I understand is to enable us to have an opportunity to clarify the situation. Clause 1 was really designed to prevent any number being added to the national identity register—such as a police national computer reference number—which would tend to reveal sensitive personal data. The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, is right to say that we did that in an attempt to respond to concerns helpfully.
	We touched on the issue of sensitive personal data in the last group of amendments on our second day in Committee on 16 November. That was the group led by Amendment No. 36, tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. I have undertaken to write to the noble Baroness before Report to deal with some of the points that she raised, and I will do so. However, in replying to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, it may help if I set out some of that background now, so that your Lordships can better understand these issues.
	The "registrable facts" set out in Clause 1(5) may look like a long list, but they are all relevant in helping to identify an individual, and will allow cross-referencing with other departments' databases during the application process. Holding the numbers on the register, as listed in paragraph (4) of Schedule 1, will also make it easier to derive joined-up government benefits from the identity card scheme. If I may give an example, it might be useful, in relation to a benefit or pension application, for the Department of Work and Pensions to be able to check someone's national insurance number against their identity card.
	The Bill was amended on Report in another place by a government amendment to respond to a point made and taken up in Committee. There had been a number of questions raised about the need to ensure that information about criminal records would not be held on the national identity register. The Government have always made it clear that they do not intend to hold medical or criminal records on that register, and the Bill achieves this by linking the statutory purposes of the scheme at Clause 1(3) to the registrable facts as defined at Clause 1(5). These registrable facts do not cover criminal or medical records, other than any voluntary information recorded at the request of the cardholder as allowed for at Clause 1(5)(i) which might, for example, include organ donor status, or matters of that sort.
	So "registrable facts" can be amended only—and I emphasise "only"—by further primary legislation. Therefore, the Bill provides a major safeguard against claims that the scope of the national identity register might be expanded in the future without proper parliamentary scrutiny. Thus it would not be possible to add criminal or medical records to the "registrable facts" at Clause 1(5) by secondary legislation. Nor would it be possible to add criminal or medical records to the list of items in Schedule 1 by secondary legislation, because Clause 3(6) requires that anything added to Schedule 1 is consistent with the statutory purposes and those, as I have just said, link back directly to the "registrable facts".
	However, a potential concern was raised in the other place that the Bill did not provide adequate reassurance that information relating to numbers would not be held that could lead to conclusions being drawn about a person's criminal record. Clause 1(5)(g) covers,
	"information about numbers allocated to him for identification purposes and about the documents to which they relate",
	and the concern was that this might conceivably be used in the future to add the police national computer—the PNC—reference number to an individual's national identity register record. While that would not provide evidence of an individual's criminal record, it would clearly suggest that he or she had one. It was to avoid that scenario that the Government amended the Bill so that it would be impossible to add to the register a number that might tend to reveal information relating to a person's criminal record, or indeed any other "sensitive personal data" within the terms of the Data Protection Act 1998.
	"Sensitive personal data", as noble Lords know, is not limited to criminal records but is defined in the Data Protection Act and covers a number of other issues, including the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject, his political opinions, his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, as well as his physical or mental health or condition. There could not be a complete exclusion of "sensitive personal data", or anything tending to reveal such data, as some information that could be apparent from, say, a photograph, might easily reveal "sensitive personal data" such as racial or ethnic origin. An identity card with a photograph of a man or woman wearing a clerical collar would, for example, tend to indicate their religious belief, although perhaps not their denomination.
	Criminal or medical records or political opinions do not come within the ambit of the "registrable facts" listed in Clause 1(5) and so could not be added to the list of items that may be held on the national identity register and are listed at Schedule 1 to the Bill. However, the Government wanted in addition to put beyond doubt that it would also not be possible to add to the register in the future any reference number which of itself was simply a number, but where its existence could tend to reveal an item of "sensitive personal data".
	Amendment No. 38A would risk narrowing the safeguard that was introduced in another place by removing the words,
	"or anything the disclosure of which would tend to reveal such data".
	I know that is not the noble Lord's intent, but it has given me an opportunity to give what I hope is a comprehensive explanation about why we think the safeguard is necessary. It works and it seemed to us to be capable of reassuring people who had genuine concerns that inappropriate information would be listed.
	If we are to achieve our objective of providing a clear reassurance that no numbers could be held that either would reveal or would tend to reveal any "sensitive personal data", those words should stay in the Bill. I hope that with that explanation the noble Lord will be content. I have the pleasure of thanking him for allowing me the opportunity to explain all of that.

Lord Lucas: On a different issue, how does this subsection tie in with subsection (5)(h)? Suppose we are living in a world where the identity card is well-used and supports a lot of commercial transactions. Suppose that I attend a Conservative Party conference and that fact gets into the register under subsection (5)(h) because my identity is checked at the door; then my political allegiance is on file. Suppose I visit a VD clinic and it similarly wants my identity as I go in. Suppose I am a Muslim and I buy something from a vintner. That again seems to be sensitive personal information. How are we going to exclude that kind of sensitive personal information from the register in any practical way?

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I want to clarify something that is obviously very important and central to the Bill. The explanation given by the Minister was extremely helpful and clear but am I not right in saying that sensitive personal data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998 does not cover data under paragraph (9) of Schedule 1? That data is what many people in lay language would call sensitive personal data and some of that data is the sort of information referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas.

Lord Selsdon: I had not intended to intervene in this debate but, because I have a great interest in identity and also in wine—the wine that we produce is certainly better than that which my noble friend may be acquiring—I thought that I would take the opportunity to read to your Lordships a ministerial interview:
	"Is big brother watching you? To be more precise, did you know that government is building up a dossier on you? It's called by the harmless sounding name of National Integrated Database. What it means is that at the press of a button any civil servant can inspect just about every detail of your life, your tax, your medical record, periods of unemployment, children's school records, the lot! And that civil servant may happen to be your next door neighbour! Well recently there has been mounting concern over this powerful, even totalitarian, weapon that the computer revolution has put into the government's hand and the man who wields the weapon is the Minister for Administrative Affairs . . . Now minister, are you laying foundations for a police state?".
	As your Lordships will be aware, that was Minister Hacker in "Yes Minister" many years ago. It was sent to me the other day and I had forgotten all about it, but I have received other letters asking whether the Minister can give an assurance that this measure will not form the basis for a police state.

Lord Renton: I wish to support this amendment. It seems to me that without it a great deal of the provisions in Clause 1 and elsewhere in the Bill will not be effective. We have to make sure that enforcement is supported by a proposition that the changes made should be notified as legal. That is what this amendment, and those grouped with it, endeavour to enforce. I hope that your Lordships from all parts of the House will support it.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My brief does not provide me with a response to that point. However, this is a serious point and I shall do my best to answer it. As the noble Baroness explained, this is a probative amendment. However, if we were to accept it as it stands, it would remove the ability to register other names or aliases, previous names, informal or stage names which have not been "legally" changed, although the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell, made a valid point in that regard. We have very good reasons for resisting the amendments as regards both customer convenience and the prevention of fraud.
	The difficulty with the amendments is that there is—as has been rightly pointed out—no definition of a legal change of name. Although some individuals use a deed poll for that purpose by no means all do so. A significant number of people merely change their name informally. I suppose that is what noble Lords do in their various guises. The register has been designed to be flexible and to accommodate the fact that a number of people use more than one name. Harry Webb, for example, might be a little perturbed that he cannot be known on the register as Cliff Richard just because he has chosen to use a stage name. As the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, observed, I believe on Second Reading, and as has been said today, many Members of this House are known by more than one name or, indeed, title. Of course, it is not intended that nicknames or family names of endearment should be recorded on the register—so I am lucky there—and it might be embarrassing if they were. We need to apply a common-sense touch here. We need to record the names that people use in interactions in their day-to-day life in the outside world. Naturally, an indecent name would not be acceptable as an alias.
	Amendment No. 83, if accepted, would have a detrimental effect on preventing fraud. Identity fraud is a serious problem and can occur when people frequently change their name and address in rapid succession in order to steal an identity or to create a new and/or fictional one. Currently, there is no reliable way to trace how often a person changes his or her name. The ID card scheme could go some way to provide this extra security. The recording of previous names on the national identity register is useful in terms of the convenience of those who are registered—customer convenience. For example, if an individual gets married or just decides to change their name, and wishes to amend their record on the NIR, organisations will be able to verify the individual against their maiden name or old name or their new name. That is far more secure than a simple marriage certificate, which is not a proof of identity and is capable of forgery, and much better than the deed poll process where there is absolutely no assurance that you are the person on the deed poll.
	In practice we intend to ask people as a matter of policy to provide a principal name that they are known by for all purposes—the name that they use commonly in the world at large, particularly with public and private sector organisations.
	This is part passport policy, which works well, and matches the aim to get people to provide a name that they use consistently in their relationship with government bodies.
	In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, I think that we have consulted the Registrar General and those to whom we need to talk about names on registers. To clear up the point, I shall drop the noble Baroness a note to ensure that we have done so. I would be sad if we had not because it seems an obvious thing to have done. We have consulted fairly widely, and the approach that we have adopted should work.

Lord Lyell of Markyate: I apologise for extending the debate but it is a difficult issue. Those who look in the Law Reports will find a case, Lyell v Lyell in relation to the 1997 general election. A vexatious litigant came to live in my constituency and changed his name by deed pool to Sir Nicholas Walter Lyell. He sought to fight me in the constituency using my name to cause confusion. Fortunately an injunction was issued to prevent it, but none the less he had changed his name by deed poll and was so known. However, there is a happy wrinkle because when his name appeared on the electoral register there was a misprint, and it came out as Sid Nicholas Walter Lyell.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I am grateful to all noble Lords—about 13, I think—who have taken part in a debate on an amendment which I had intended to lead to some clarity. I think it has just opened another can of worms. I certainly do not intend to examine that can of worms any more today. I shall consider what we are to do before Report stage.
	I was grateful to the Minister for his response at the end to my noble friend Lord Lucas. I understood him to be saying something that he had not quite said earlier: that we may elect what names we put down and will not then be penalised for leaving out names. If that is the case, then it sounds a very common-sense way forward. I note that the Minister said that this is intended to have a common-sense touch. He then went on, however, to say first that people should register names they use in their interaction with day-to-day life, and then the names to be used consistently in contact with public bodies. Those might be different.
	There has been some confusion. I hope that the Minister's closing remarks to my noble friend Lord Lucas will mean greater clarity. If we find that the Government think again on that point, obviously we may have to return to it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Seccombe: This probing amendment will remove "gender" as a reference to any individual's identity within the context of the national ID register in Clause 1. The purpose of this amendment is the question the Minister as to how the use of gender information will sit with the Gender Recognition Act 2004. For example, will the information be entered as the gender on the birth certificate, or as the gender on a gender recognition certificate after a sex change? Will and should both pieces of information be kept? Could it not be an infringement of personal data, considering the large number of uses Her Majesty's Government are proposing the database and cards be used for, as well as the potential function creep in the future?
	Section 10(1) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 states:
	"Where there is a UK birth register entry in relation to a person to whom a full gender recognition certificate is issued, the Secretary of State must send a copy of the certificate to the appropriate Registrar General."
	Can the Minister confirm whether the onus would be on the Secretary of State to inform the ID register of any gender change, as it is in the 2004 Act, or on the individual involved. Would the Government pay for the change of information? Will the use of gender as an identity reference adhere to the principles set out in Section 21 of the 2004 Act with regard to foreign gender change and marriage? Can the noble Lord clarify whether they accept gender change as having occurred in approved countries or territories only as agreed under the Gender Recognition Act?
	It is all very well for the Government to argue that this is an enabling Bill, but we need to be clear from the start how it interacts with current legislation. I hope that the noble Lord can shed some light on the issue. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: Amendment No. 40 would leave gender out of the list of registrable facts. Gender needs to be included because it is mandatory for International Civil Aviation Organisation standards for travel documentation. It is included in passports and needs to be included on ID cards. It is also a fundamental piece of standard identity information. Knowing someone's gender immediately means that any search to find an individual's record is reduced by 50 per cent.
	We completely understand the concerns of transgender people, and our officials have had representations from and discussions with Press for Change, a representative group for transgender people. We accept that it will be much easier for them if gender were not shown on the face of an ID card. However, if we are to meet the standards for travel documentation, that will not be possible and we must recognise that the number of people in this category is relatively small. We have made it clear that there will be special arrangements, including strict confidentiality for anyone who changes gender, so that it is not possible for people who have no need to know to be aware that an individual is holding an identity card in a different gender.
	Those with gender recognition certificates will, of course, be entitled to a passport and an identity card in the acquired gender, as it is legally recognised. However, we believe we need to go further, so it is intended that those living what is called a dual-gendered life will be able to have a second, plain card in the acquired gender. That would not be valid for travel but would allow that person to use the identity verification service in the acquired gender. There will need to be solid evidence that the person suffers from gender dysphoria—the condition that defines a person as transgender, moving from one gender to the other—rather than is a transvestite. We shall ensure that staff training and facilities will be designed to be as discreet and as sensitive as possible to the needs of such people, which, of course, the United Kingdom Passport Service is already in dealing with them.
	I understand that the situation has not changed from the 2004 Act. The way in which that works will be transposed into this legislation. We are grateful to the noble Baroness for tabling the amendment but, having heard what I have said, I hope that she will feel able to withdraw it.

The Earl of Erroll: What the noble Lord has said could be very useful depending on the name that one uses. I have always worried about choosing whether to include a title in the registered name on a card. As people have preconceived ideas, one way or the other, I have a credit card with my title on it and one without it, depending on how I think a shop will react towards me. That is perfectly true and one would be very silly not to do that. Clearly there will be a facility to have multiple cards linked to one biometric record on the national identity register. Therefore, it could be useful for people who have a stage name and a real name—they have two public persona—and for celebrities to be able to travel semi-incognito with two cards with different names on the face of them, linking back into the same record in the national identity register. I believe it would be useful to allow that.

The Earl of Northesk: My focus in this amendment is the wording in Clause 1(7)(d),
	"if he has died, the date of his death".
	The inference of the current drafting is that those who have died could be required, on pain of civil liability, to record that fact on the register. It could also conceivably mean that such individuals could be required to enter in the register the address of their current abode and their residential status, again on pain of civil liability. Quite how the Government anticipate that would be achieved by an individual who is no longer sentient is beyond me. Indeed, the prospect of the register holding data from beyond the grave about every cemetery, perhaps even about burials at sea, is interesting.
	That aside, there is a wider issue. We can assume that the logic of the scheme is based on finding appropriate technological and IT solutions for an eventual population profile of 60 million or so individuals. As a matter of course, the amount of data held on the register will be subject to upward and downward variation as a function of demographic changes—migration, the attainment of qualifying age and so on. But the inference of the provision is that the register will hold the details of all the registrable facts, including biometrics, of all qualifying individuals, living or dead. That has implications for the IT architecture of the scheme. As a matter of course, it implies that the register has to be constructed to provide additional capacity for expansion in future, on the basis that, when someone dies, his registrable facts will be maintained. Indeed, this may be relevant to the caution sounded in KPMG's report about a potential shortage of data storage space. Moreover, as biometric identifiers are added to the system without limit, their reliability as unique individual identifiers will degrade.
	I fully understand the underlying motive of the provision; namely, to make due allowance for what could be called The Day of the Jackal or the Lord Buckingham scenario. To that extent, I do not object to its inclusion per se. But it creates huge problems, not only in terms of the scheme's IT design, but also in terms of qualifying the data of the deceased for deletion on the grounds of relevance. Without useable criteria for the deletion of such records that satisfy the requirements of the Bill and those of the data protection legislation, the register and its data run the risk of becoming wholly unwieldy. Accordingly, there is a strong argument in favour of the drafting in Clause 1(7)(d) being tightened up. I hope the Minister can explain how it is intended that the scheme will operate in respect of those who have died, without giving rise to the difficulties to which I have referred. I beg to move.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: Echoing the noble Lord, Lord Williams, I recall two well attested cases, first of the Times correspondent in the Boxer Rebellion and, secondly, of a former Lord Bessborough, both of whom read their obituaries in the Times. When they called the Times to verify or to demonstrate that they were not in fact dead, on both occasions the subeditor replied, "Before you go any further, where are you speaking from?". Clearly, it was a standard operating process at the Times to respond to questions of that nature in that manner.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I do not have an answer immediately to hand. The noble Lord may well have raised a good question, and I will give him an answer.
	I assure noble Lords that the Identity Cards Bill contains no such powers. We are planning to link electronically with the General Register Office to obtain death notifications. This means that families will not have to be burdened with additional administration when a loved one dies. As soon as the agency is notified by the General Register Office that a death has taken place, the ID card will of course be cancelled, thereby preventing any fraudulent use of that card.
	As with passports, next of kin will be requested to surrender the identity card of deceased family members. However, it is hoped that this information can be included in information provided by the General Register Office, so no unnecessary communication with the family is necessary at what I think we accept would be a very difficult time.
	Where a relative has died abroad, however, and the death has been reported to local authorities, the agency will not be notified by the general registrar's office. It will thus be in the family's interest to do so, to reduce the likelihood of the deceased person's card being used in a fraudulent manner. There is however no requirement in the Bill, or power to impose a penalty, if the family forgets to inform the agency.
	The Secretary of State can require surrender of an ID card under Clause 13 and failure to do so could, in theory, give rise to a civil penalty. That power is important, given the history of misuse of documents belonging to dead people, but it would not be appropriate to impose a penalty on family members where there is no suspicion of abuse. The code of practice under Clause 36 will make that abundantly clear. The noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, asked where that appeared in Schedule 1; I understand that it is in paragraph 5(c) of Schedule 1.
	A number of other points were raised. The noble Earl, Lord Northesk, made one about the date of death being a registrable fact. I explained that it needs to be held on the register, but obviously it does not mean that if you are deceased you have to notify your death. That would just be nonsensical. Nor will there a duty on bereaved relatives to inform, as I also explained. Those cases where death is uncertain raise an interesting point. Here, it is intended that records on the register could be flagged if it seems possible that someone has died. However, a formal record of death would not be logged until there was certainty and a clear decision on that. On the specific point of why there would be a date, it can be recorded and will in some cases be highly relevant to the prevention of fraud—though it need not be. There is no legal obligation on anyone to provide it but, if known, it may well be recorded. I am sure that will most usually be the case. The noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy, ultimately answered her own question. It is obvious that babies will not be entered on the register, as 16 is the minimum age.
	There is no obligation to notify the registrar of death, so there is no penalty against relatives who do not inform the national identity register of a person's death. Existing obligations under current law to inform the Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages continue as they are. I think that has answered the majority of points raised in discussion.

Baroness Seccombe: We have been dealing with the specific question of DNA, but are still left with the issue that the Bill is deliberately framed to give the widest possible powers to the Government in compiling, maintaining and identifying information that is usable on the register.
	Clause 1(7)(e) is very broad indeed, referring to any physical characteristic capable of identifying a person—their race, perhaps? There is no direct reference to the limiting provisions of Schedule 1, and there should be. Without any limiting reference, it could include a person's height or weight, the fact that they had a tattoo on their right ankle, or the fact that they walked with a limp or were disabled. None of that would be ruled out by Clause 1(7)(e).
	Is there not a chance that the police and security services, who we are told are the keenest proponents of this legislation, might find such information useful? "Ah, well," the Minister may say, "Clause 3(a) says that only information in the schedule may be included". That is not so tight, however, as a reference to Schedule 1 would be here. After all, Clause 3 also contains a provision allowing any information to be recorded that an individual wants, and which the Secretary of State considers practical and appropriate. Could I record, if I wanted to, that I am white, small—or, as someone else suggested, "of medium height"—or disabled?
	What is more, the clause also allows the Secretary of State to modify Schedule 1—a subject to which we will return on later amendments. Schedule 1 as presently drafted offers more limitation. It seems to rule out the compilation of a race register, although I would like reassurance on that. In many government documents, are we not asked to provide details of our racial characteristics? Paragraph 7(c) of the schedule allows the inclusion of any information in connection with an application to be included in the register. Would that include an application for a driving licence which is a designated document in which someone might record a disability? Could that be used to build up a disability register, for example?
	Sub-paragraph (e) is framed much too broadly. A reference to the schedule would help, but even that, as I have indicated, may be open to abuse. Will racial characteristics or disability ever be entered on the register? Will a person's height or weight ever be registered? If not, where in the Bill is the power to prevent a future government building up a race register, given the clauses in the Bill to which I have referred? I hope that the Minister can accept this tightening of the Bill and I look forward to her reassurance in reply. I beg to move.

Lord Lyell of Markyate: These two amendments together are really helpful in probing this Bill. Against that background, I shall try to take a thoroughly constructive approach to the Government's objectives in the Bill in order to seek to test whether those objectives are likely to be achieved.
	The primary purposes of the Bill—national security, the detection and prevention of serious crime, immigration controls, unlawful working and so on—are perfectly proper objectives. The objective is to have a widespread and complete register of all the residents of this country—and, in a sense, of everyone in this country. Whether one likes it or not, I can see that there is a case to be made for having a detailed register of everyone who is in the country, whether as a citizen or a visitor; for maintaining their biometric details; and for tracking where they are going, as it is intended to do, through the identity card they will receive and have to produce every time they leave the country or make an application for some designated document.
	To take a simple example, if a citizen of this country applies comparatively early because they want a passport and then you find they are going regularly to Pakistan, you might begin to take rather more interest in them than you might in people who do not seem to go regularly anywhere interesting at all.
	I can see how that would be of some value in relation to the 80 per cent of the population who, whether you call it voluntary or compulsory, are likely to want driving licences and passports, and within a year or two are pretty likely to apply for an identity card. Then, however, as Amendment No. 47 sensibly points out, you are still left with an enormous gap, of which the first ingredient is the 20 per cent of the population that is not likely to apply voluntarily for a card. As my noble friend Lady Seccombe has said, a huge number of people come and go from this country, and from all the free societies of western Europe and elsewhere in the world, with very little record.
	I went to the United States in April. One now needs a visa—or a visa waiver, as they nicely call it—and one provides one's biometric details. It is all done quite quickly. The noble Baroness gave us the figures: that system produces biometric details and identity for some millions of people. However, we are not going to do that, so we have a gap of about 20 per cent of our own population—which, if one just takes the adults, is probably 10 million people—and also of all the other people who come and go. It seems to me that this will undercut for years, until the scheme is modified, a great deal of the utility of this very expensive scheme.
	If we are to have the scheme, let it work; that is one approach. But if we are to have it with enormous gaps, is it right to spend so much money? I come back to what will be regarded as a less constructive approach to the Bill. None the less, I think that these are reasonable questions.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon: As probably the oldest person in the Chamber at the present time, I believe we should think very carefully about this. I feel sure that people over 70 would feel excluded if the system was compulsory. They would say, "Why are we incapable of going out and blowing ourselves up? Some of us, even when we reach 80, can still get up in your Lordships' House to make a speech. We are equally capable of handling a gun, if necessary. Many of us are active enough to get around the country very often. Indeed, because of our age and, perhaps, 'fogeyite' appearance, we might get into places that younger people could not. We would be less suspicious figures".
	I am not sure that the arguments being used are good arguments. Before long the population of this country aged over 65 will reach very high proportions. Older people are much more active and are often much richer than young people. They can get about and no one takes a blind bit of notice of them. People think, "There's an old fogey. Why do we both bother about him?". Although I am absolutely opposed to the identity card system, if identity cards are made compulsory, they should be compulsory for everyone between the age of 18 and whenever the person pops off. On this occasion, I cannot support the amendment.

Baroness Seccombe: I support these amendments, which provide a simple change that will ensure that all orders under Clause 2, which sets out who may be entered on the register, are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. As the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, explained, the clause as it currently stands provides only for the Secretary of State to modify the age of entry on the register by order subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. It does not however include the regulation giving powers in subsection (3). By amending "subsection (6)" to "this section" in line 24, subsection (7) will encompass subsection (3) and subsection (6) powers.
	In Amendments Nos. 23 and 52, we have already debated the questions that we had about options that have not been included in this clause regarding exclusion from the proposed identity card scheme. Can the Minister please take this opportunity to explain to the Committee in detail the situations that she envisages falling under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (3)? It would be better to have the affirmative scrutiny of Parliament rather than a negative power that has the potential to be quite wide ranging.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I tried to give an example of when someone could not claim entitlement under the provisions but it would make good sense to allow him to do so to meet the needs. For example, someone who is 15 and 364 days old may apply for a new passport, but because he is not yet 16 he is not entitled to have an ID card. It would be appropriate to enable him to have both.
	Subsection (4) enables us to have the flexibility to deal with the sort of situation that I have described. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, and I am grateful to him for seeing the utility and sense of having that flexibility. But the information that we provide would only be available to the Secretary of State. It does not enable information to be obtained from other sources.
	I gave examples, too, of those who we may not want to be included. Information is important to be held to disable them from taking advantage of an opportunity to obtain something that we would not wish them to have.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: No. If your Lordships consider the practicality of when that data are given, the information could be held to use later to make it convenient for the individual. The Bill is trying to do what is convenient, easy and proportionate.
	We have real issues with this. The amendment proposed by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, would remove all flexibility from the provision, and we could not do any of the things that I am sure your Lordships agree are sensible and proportionate. That is why we want to retain Clause 2(4).
	To clarify the issue of data from other sources to the register, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, and the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, understand that information added to the register will generally be provided by the applicant under Clause 5. He can be asked to provide fingerprints and other biometric information. Entry in the register may also be made under Clause 2(4) in relation to someone who has not applied if information is otherwise available to be recorded. An example of that is when the Secretary of State already holds fingerprints as a result of a biometric visa application, as I described, or an application for asylum. The Secretary of State may be able to use the fingerprints already available to add the individual's entry in the register instead of requiring him to provide another set. We want to be able to do those practical things.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: We in Parliament are entitled to determine whether something is criminal or civil. We collectively are of the view that the penalties which are appropriate under this Bill, should remain civil and not criminal. Parliament, I am sure your Lordships will be reassured to know, is still sovereign.

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in support from the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats and the Ulster Unionists. I hope, wish and pray that the flood of Northern Ireland legislation coming to this House will receive similar all-party support.
	I am not looking to create problems for myself, and if I have to withdraw that thanks, I do so. I say that in the best spirits of the House, however. We are very grateful for the support for the Order.

Lord Crickhowell: My Lords, during the short debate on Amendment No. 53, we discovered how wide the discretionary power of the Secretary of State to make entries in the register consistent with the statutory purposes is. We know that the statutory purposes are widely drawn. Although the Minister who replied in that debate gave us some limited and persuasive examples, she did not deny the fact that the scope of the clause was much wider. It therefore seems essential that individuals who may be affected should know exactly what the entry will be. Any other situation would be intolerable. That information about an individual that may be of considerable importance should be placed on a register, and placed there because the individual is considered to be infringing national security or some other crucial matter, without the individual knowing about it would be an extraordinary imposition on individual rights and freedom. It has been said the Data Protection Act perhaps provides for such an entry of information, but this amendment must be made to the Bill. My noble friend drew attention earlier to a case that has received publicity which suggests that the Data Protection Act can perhaps be overruled by later action and legislation. So for all those reasons, and I suspect that there would be a good many others if we were to probe the matter at greater length, I strongly support my noble friend's amendment.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: In moving Amendment No. 73, I shall speak to a manuscript Amendment No. 80A, which I lodged earlier in the day, having notified the Front Benches, the Clerks and the Chairmen.
	The amendment to Schedule 1 states:
	"Page 40, line 4, at end insert—
	'No information may be recorded in the Register unless it is a registrable fact as defined in section 1'".
	That manuscript amendment and Amendment No. 73, which would leave out subsections (5) to (7) of Clause 3 are designed to clarify a crucial aspect of the Bill.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Scotland of Asthal, said on the first day in Committee that the governing clause in this Bill is Clause 1. She said that there could be nothing in the provisions of Schedule 1—"Information that may be recorded in Register"—that was not within the ambit of Clause 1. It is therefore a pity that Schedule 1 has Section 3 as its section reference, whereas it should more essentially refer to Section 1.
	My point is a simple one, and I hope the Government will smile upon it because it is in their interests as much as anyone else's to make abundantly clear that, as I put it here:
	"No information may be recorded in the Register unless it is a registrable fact as defined in section 1".
	That will put paid to great deal of confusion which might otherwise arise, for example, under Clause 3(5), which allows the Secretary of State to modify by order information for the time being set out in Schedule 1.
	If the Minister is willing to accept my manuscript amendment, I shall be happy to withdraw my Amendment No. 73, because it will be perfectly redundant. On that basis, I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: It will not surprise the noble Lord that I cannot accept either of his Amendments Nos. 73 and 80A. I shall address my comments to the noble Lord on his manuscript amendment.
	This amendment would have the effect that information could not be recorded in the register unless it was included in the registrable facts in Clause 1(5). It has always been our intention that no personal information can be held on the register unless it could be defined as a registrable fact. Schedule 1(1) to (4) lists in detail what information may be recorded in the register. It is our view that all of the information in those paragraphs is covered by the registrable facts.
	When bringing government amendments back on Report, however, we hope to put beyond any doubt the answer to a point which the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, has made in earlier debates as to whether Clause 1(5)(b) allows us to record someone's principal place of residence. I stand by what was said earlier on that issue, but we are, as always, grateful to the noble Lord for raising the point. It is our intention to make the position even clearer than it currently is.
	Clause 3(1) provides that the only information which may be recorded in the register is that included in Schedule 1; information of a technical nature for the administration of the scheme and the issue of cards; and voluntary information. If this amendment were accepted, it would have the result that the register would not be able to hold information of a technical nature that is contained in Clause 3(1)(b) and (c). The result of this would be that, without the technical information, the register would be unable to function. The noble Lord may have a secret desire for that to be the case, but I do not think that is the intention of the amendment, and I am sure that noble Lords would not wish to exclude information of a technical nature if the result was that the register would be rendered useless.
	I understand the concern behind the noble Lord's amendment. I hope I have convinced him that it is undesirable.
	On the understanding that we shall bring something back on Report on the specific point of principal places of residence, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment and not to press the earlier amendment to which he referred.